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Theoretical contributions regarding the functioning of European labor markets emphasize the 
possibility of reconciling labor flexibility and employment security (flexicurity). Labor flexibility 
refers to the ability of firms to have greater control over staffing decisions (hiring and firing, work 
hours, and use of nonstandard contracts) than does labor. Employment laws in some European 
countries more than in others have allowed, although not without controversy, labor flexibility and 
employment security to be viewed as mutually supportive labor market components (Wilthagen 
and Tros 2004) leading to win-win solutions that further the interests of workers and employers 
(Keune and Serrano 2014). Denmark is considered the prime European example of flexicurity. 
Employers have considerable discretion to dismiss workers as needed, unemployment benefits 
ensure that workers maintain their income value while unemployed, and active labor market 
policies provide resources for re-employment (Jørgensen and Madsen 2007). In the early 2000s, 
the EU adopted flexicurity as the centerpiece of its approach to labor market regulation, and in the 
economic crisis of 2008 it became a key instrument for stimulating job growth and recovery 
(European Commission 2012). 
Distinct national institutional settings and legal frameworks enable or constrain the development 
of labor market policies designed to create optimal conditions for labor flexibility while offering 
financial and social security to employees (Bekker and Wilthagen 2008). Recent research has gone 
beyond the national level to highlight sector- and company-level governance mechanisms that also 
influence the definition of flexible and secure employment. This research argues that the 
effectiveness of any flexicurity strategy followed by national governments depends on institutional 
variation at the sector- and company-level (Crouch and Keune 2012). 
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Research at the sectoral and company levels, however, is underdeveloped. Studies that reconcile 
flexibility and security tend to focus on questions of whether institutional preconditions lead to 
specific socioeconomic outcomes. Our understanding of the socio-political dynamics governing 
these institutions and their transformation is, however, weak. (Baccaro and Howell 2011). 
Moreover, although distinct features of national regulatory settings are important explanatory 
variables, they are static and do not reflect institutional change (Doellgast 2008). This trend is 
because the decline in union density and bargaining coverage as well as increasingly varied 
employer strategies are weakening the causal relationship between national institutions and 
outcomes. A more nuanced understanding of how national-institutional settings interact with firm-
level sociopolitical forces is therefore required. Company-level studies allow researchers to take 
into account power relations (Crouch 2005). This consideration is relevant for the study of 
flexicurity as related outcomes depend on the social partners’ bargaining power embedded in the 
evolution of power relationships within a company. In addition, when labor relations are 
conceptualized as multilevel relationships (Keune and Marginson 2013), flexicurity studies should 
take into consideration how institutional- and firm-level contexts interact and how sociopolitical 
and socioeconomic forces at different levels shape this interaction. This interaction involves 
exploring the forces that shape flexicurity policy interventions within companies and 
understanding their social implications. These considerations are central to this article. By viewing 
flexibility and security as the result of the bargaining activity within the contested terrain of the 
company, we focus on explaining how particular flexibility and security outcomes are produced 
by understanding the power forces influencing local negotiations. This aspect is neglected in the 
relatively limited literature on company-level flexicurity, which presents flexibility and security 
primarily as the result of HRM strategies (Rydell and Wigblad 2011). 
4 
 
 
Our empirical research focuses on subsidiaries of multinational companies (MNCs) and explores 
two questions. First, how does local bargaining within MNC subsidiaries influence flexibility–
security trade-offs? Second, to what extent and how do macro-level institutions interact with the 
subsidiary level to provide social actors with the capability to negotiate over flexibility and 
security? 
We examine how local actors negotiate flexibility and security at MNC subsidiary level within 
different institutional environments, assessing how and to what extent institutions affect local 
unions’ ability to protect employee interests. We demonstrate that although flexibility and security 
arrangements are rooted in national institutions, local practices evolve out of a series of negotiated 
compromises and power relationships rather than as the consequence of management strategy or 
institutions at large. Particularly, flexibility–security outcomes are shaped primarily by differences 
in workers’ structural power at the level of each subsidiary. This suggests a dynamic view on how 
institutional arrangements influence flexicurity while indicating that power relationships can 
contribute to a more fine-grained understanding of contemporary labor markets phenomena, 
thereby enriching discussions on the policy implications thereof. 
We focus on MNCs as key players in the European economy, and they have been shown to steer 
the direction of change in national employment systems. They represent the best context for 
exploring the dynamic framework shaping interaction between local contexts and nation states 
(Edwards, Marginson, and Ferner 2013). We compare flexicurity negotiations in 12 manufacturing 
subsidiaries of four MNCs located in Belgium, Britain and Germany (i.e., a subsidiary of each 
MNC in each country). We distinguish between micro- and macro-level effects on subsidiary-level 
flexibility–security outcomes, and focus on four subsidiary-level variables: market competition; 
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technology; nature of the product; and form of inter-subsidiary dependencies or integration; and 
one macro-level institutional variable: the national collective bargaining system. 
 
Defining Flexibility–Security Trade-Offs 
Building on the concept of “distributive” and “integrative” bargaining defined by Walton and 
McKersie (1965), Ibsen and Mailand (2011) distinguished between “compensated” and “not 
compensated” trade-offs when examining sector-level bargaining and flexicurity in Denmark, 
Spain, and Britain. According to this concept, the concessions contained in some local agreements 
are compensated for through payments or other benefits for workers. Local unions may accept 
increases in flexibility in exchange for workforce security. By contrast, in situations of non-
compensated trade-offs, increased flexibility does not include enhanced security. Building on the 
concepts of compensated and not compensated concessions, we define our dependent variable as 
the flexibility–security trade-off at the MNC subsidiary level. These trade-offs can be either 
“balanced” (flexibility and security are compensated equitably for the benefit of both sides), or 
“unbalanced” (benefiting one side more than the other). 
To frame our outcome of interest, however, we need to understand the sources of inter-subsidiary 
variation in local bargaining and their effect on flexibility–security trade-offs, within and across 
different MNC subsidiaries. We identify how MNCs and their subsidiaries are configured, and we 
characterize the institutional and local contexts in which they operate, in order to identify how 
organizational factors interact with societal factors such as national institutions (Mueller 1994). 
We argue that the mix of national institutions, organizational configurations and strategy, and 
contextual subsidiary-specific factors shape the way employment policy and practices are 
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developed within MNCs (Edwards 2011). These factors also affect union bargaining power and 
influence. 
The notion of power is central to our understanding of flexibility–security trade-offs. We use 
power as a relational concept. As Held (1995: 170) argued, “power expresses at one and the same 
time the intentions and purposes of agencies and institutions and the relative balance of resources 
they can deploy with respect to each other.” Moreover, the power resources approach (Korpi 2006) 
suggests that workers’ power is rooted in a context characterized by the presence of structural 
power (Wright 2000). Such power stems from workers’ strategic positions and locations within 
occupational, industrial, and local labor market structures. Hence, environmental factors such as 
company- and local-level conditions influence workers’ structural power. Industrial relations 
processes and outcomes are determined by the constantly evolving interaction of environmental 
pressures and organizational responses. We associate the concept of unbalanced (not compensated) 
and balanced (compensated) trade-offs to Wright’s (2000) definition of structural power to explain 
how those trade-offs occur. We identify four outcomes or flexibility–security trade-offs and 
propose that these outcomes will be shaped by MNCs’ local contextual factors and organizational 
configuration: 
1. Negative balanced trade-offs refer to situations in which the balanced nature of the trade-
off is achieved despite workers being in a relatively weak position on account of their low 
structural power (negative), preventing them from leveraging power through the unions. 
Hence, flexibility and security are compensated through concessions, i.e., labor is forced 
to concede flexibility for security. 
2. Positive balanced trade-offs refer to situations in which the balanced nature of the trade-
off is achieved through workers having a high level of structural power (positive), enabling 
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them to leverage power through the unions, translating into security guarantees. Flexibility 
and security are compensated through consensual negotiation, implying that labor is not 
forced to make concessions. 
3. Negative unbalanced trade-offs refer to situations in which the absence of compensatory 
mechanisms is the result of labor’s weak structural power (negative), giving management 
the ability to impose flexibility. 
4. Positive unbalanced trade-offs refer to situations in which the non-compensation of 
flexibility and security results from labor’s high structural power (positive), giving the 
workforce the ability to impose security. 
 
Influence of Market Competition, Technology, and the Nature of the Product 
Building on Wright’s (2000) concept of workers’ structural power, we can be argue that the degree 
of market competition and technology are directly related to it. Bélanger (2006) illustrated how 
technology can offer a more or less favorable ground for employees’ control over work by 
affecting their capacity to gain autonomy and power in the execution of their work. The use of 
simple technology, with a high degree of rationalization and homogenous production processes, 
provides few opportunities for work autonomy and control, and results in low structural power, 
whereas the use of complex technology grants greater operational autonomy, and thus higher 
structural power. 
Furthermore, technology is associated with different product markets and levels of competition. 
Bélanger and Edwards (2007) explained that low levels of technology and simple production 
processes encourage imitation, leading to greater competition. By contrast, using sophisticated 
technology to produce differentiated or customized products is less likely to encourage imitators, 
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as they are discouraged by the production complexity involved and the high investment needed to 
enter the market. 
Similarly, looking at MNC subsidiaries, Edwards (2011) argued that local workforce autonomy 
would be higher when products are differentiated, as this requires locally specific elements in 
production design, work organization, and workforce management. Thus, when markets are more 
predictable and stable—as is the case with workplaces facing low competition and using high-tech 
facilities to manufacture differentiated products—management can afford to offer security. This 
outcome is an important one for workers who, in turn, are more likely to develop stronger ties to 
the company and to be more open to compromises. Moreover, competitive pressure interacts with 
choice, discretion, and power on the part of labor and management to affect the course and 
structure of industrial relations systems. Within those, high market competition possibly leads to 
tight plant-level management control systems (Brown, Bryson, and Forth 2009), in turn curtailing 
union bargaining power as a result of reduced workers’ structural power. 
Proposition 1: 
1a) Negative trade-offs are more likely to occur when market competition is high 
and companies produce standardized goods using simple technologies, as these 
reduce workers’ structural power. 
1b) Positive trade-offs are more likely when market competition is low and 
companies produce differentiated goods using complex technologies, as these 
enhance workers’ structural power. 
 
Inter-Subsidiary Dependencies 
Inter-subsidiary dependencies refer to the way multinationals link up their operations (subsidiaries) 
across borders. The literature refers to international integration (Boxall and Purcell 2011) to denote 
different company strategies and configurations, including the extent to which MNCs integrate 
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operations across countries or allow them to operate more independently. Moreover, integration 
describes how HRM practices are organized internationally (Edwards, Marginson, and Ferner 
2013). 
Interdependencies between MNC subsidiaries take two forms: vertical (segmentation) and 
horizontal (replication) (Edwards and Ferner 2002). With vertical integration, the national 
subsidiary is a distinct segment of an interdependent production process and has specific roles. 
Each operating unit is responsible for a certain production step, thereby creating synergies across 
subsidiaries. By contrast, horizontal integration means that local operations perform similar 
functions, characterized by comparable technology and job profiles. Any expansion is realized by 
replicating what is done in other countries (Edwards 2011). 
Studies have examined inter-subsidiary dependencies and the structuring of employment 
relationships within MNCs (Marginson 1992; Marginson, Lavelle, Quintanilla, Adam, and 
Sanchez-Mangas 2013). Although no causal relationship exists, greater interdependency is 
associated with formal structures for regulating employment relations, such as international 
policymaking bodies (Tregaskis, Glover, and Ferner 2005). As Marginson (1992) argued, higher 
inter-plant dependencies can make MNCs vulnerable to national and local bargaining pressure 
from trade unions. This outcome is typical of situations in which inter-subsidiary dependencies are 
assured through vertical integration, where inter-plant synergies depend on an undisrupted 
exchange of parts and knowledge. Recalling Wright’s concept of structural power, “inter-
subsidiary dependency via segmentation may offer to workers a strategic position which could 
constitute instances of structural power enabling to enhance the potential for industrial action by 
workers in one part of the business to have major repercussions elsewhere in the company” 
(Marginson 1992: 537, emphasis added). Because of inter-subsidiary dependencies, vertical 
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integration can increase national subsidiaries’ vulnerability to nationally based union action, 
helping to achieve compromises (balanced trade-offs) in local negotiations. Conversely, under 
horizontal integration, national subsidiaries’ vulnerability to local union action may be reduced 
because of the absence of inter-subsidiary dependencies, weakening the scope to reach local 
compromises on flexibility–security trade-offs and leading to unbalanced outcomes. 
Proposition 2: 
2a) A balanced trade-off is more likely when MNCS are more vertically 
integrated because of labor’s ability to trade flexibility for security in local 
bargaining. 
2b) An unbalanced trade-off is more likely when MNCs are more horizontally 
integrated because of labor and management being unable to trade flexibility for 
security in local bargaining. 
 
Collective Bargaining Institutions 
Examining players’ behavioral patterns is important when we use new institutionalism theory to 
understand the impact of bargaining structures on locally negotiated flexicurity arrangements. 
Recent studies have shown that single-employer bargaining offers greater scope for employers to 
implement advantageous flexibility–security combinations compared to multi-employer 
bargaining, which conversely facilitates broader employee control of flexibility–security trade-
offs (Marginson and Galetto 2014). This trend is because multi-employer arrangements (e.g., 
Belgium, Germany) are based on clear procedural rules linking sector and company levels, 
representing collective resources that may attribute bargaining power to unions in local 
negotiations on the basis of the universal coverage offered by sector-level agreements. By contrast, 
under single-employer bargaining (e.g., Britain) the procedural security offered by sector-level 
bargaining is missing, leading to a situation in which negotiation outcomes are more dependent on 
“local power imbalances.” Moreover, whereas in Britain pay is an integral part of company-level 
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packages that typically also address flexibility, in Belgium this is much less the case than in 
Germany, where the capacity to derogate from sector-level agreements offers greater scope for 
local settlements. 
Under multilevel bargaining, sectoral agreements particularly shape local negotiations in which 
the linkage between sector and company levels is achieved through delegation (Marginson and 
Galetto 2014). This type of delegation is the case in Belgium and Germany where sector-level 
agreements determine a wide range of issues, while allowing for additional local-level 
negotiations. In Belgium, however, the delegation principle provides a set of rules to be followed 
by management and unions when negotiating locally, restricting the possibility to deviate from 
(inter-)sector agreements. Employers’ room to maneuver at workplace level is arguably reduced. 
By contrast, in Germany company-level agreements can derogate from sector agreements through 
opening or opt-out clauses, offering management scope to push through flexibility measures to 
which unions may feel forced to agree. 
Proposition 3: 
3a) Multi-employer bargaining arrangements favor labor’s ability to achieve 
security-enhancing (or flexibility-reducing) measures (positive trade-offs). 
3b) Multi-employer bargaining arrangements with derogation favor employers’ 
ability to achieve flexibility-enhancing (or security-reducing) measures (negative 
trade-offs) more than multi-employer systems without derogation. 
3c) Single-employer bargaining favors management’s ability to achieve 
flexibility-enhancing (or security-reducing) measures (negative trade-offs). 
 
Research Design and Methodology 
The study was conducted in MNC subsidiaries in the manufacturing sector during 2011–2012. 
Belgium, Britain, and Germany were the countries selected for the study. Union presence, as 
indicated by membership density, was at least 25%, and in 9 of the 12 subsidiaries, 70% or higher 
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(Table 3). We used a macro-micro approach, in which we define macro as national-level and micro 
as firm-level, as a core aim of model building in sociology is to examine the interaction between 
macro- and micro-level social phenomena contributing to shaping flexibility–security trade-offs 
(Coleman 1990). Motivated by theoretical considerations, we selected variables at macro- 
(Proposition 3) and micro-level (Proposition 1, 2) to study their impact on flexibility–security 
trade-offs at the subsidiary level. In so doing, we pave the way for a novel analysis of the power 
forces shaping flexicurity, considering intra- (and inter-) country variation. Macro-micro research 
particularly suits this scope since “researchers engaged in macro-micro research are not only 
interested in between-country differences but also in using context variables to explain within- and 
between-country variation” (Billiet 2013: 276). 
We study subsidiaries of two U.S.-American and two French mechanical engineering MNCs in 
Germany, Belgium, and Britain, using a total of 12 cases. To avoid any headquarters bias, the 
multinational’s country of origin does not overlap with the countries investigated. Although 
country of origin is a feature of the research design, we do not consider it a substantive variable of 
interest in the study. We focus on the impact of organizational configurations (e.g., inter-subsidiary 
dependencies or form of integration) and subsidiary-level contextual factors (e.g., market 
competition, technology, nature of the product) and institutional settings (e.g., collective 
bargaining) as theoretically selected variables shaping the flexibility–security trade-offs at 
workplace level. Within MNCs, we look at subsidiaries of the same business unit in each of the 
three countries. Hence, variation is created across, but not within, the MNC. Specifically, while 
subsidiaries in Company1 and Company2 feature standardized and rather simple (continuous) 
production processes and technology, subsidiaries in Company3 and Company4 produce highly 
specialized and diversified products. Also, while inter-subsidiary dependencies in Company1 and 
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Company 4 reflect vertical integration, in Company2 and Company3 subsidiaries replicate 
operations. The cases were selected to enable 2-by-2 comparisons. Specifically, in the first step a 
2-by-2 comparison based on technology (simple and complex), nature of the product (standardized 
and differentiated), and market competition (high and low) addresses Proposition 1. In a second 
step, a further comparison looks at variation within positive and negative trade-offs, illustrating 
the impact of the form of inter-subsidiary dependencies on these outcomes (Proposition 2). In a 
third step, we assess the extent to which (and how) macro-level institutions affect outcomes 
(Proposition 3). The variation in the subsidiary-level variables is illustrated in Table 1. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Data Description, Analysis, and Operationalization 
The empirical data stem from 70 semi-structured interviews (90–120 minutes) and document 
analysis of 12 subsidiaries cases Because of the macro-micro approach, interviews were carried 
out at different levels. We interviewed European strategic management and European Works 
Council representatives as well as subsidiary-level HR managers and union and employee 
representatives (see Table A.1 in Appendix). 
The interviews provided insights into day-to-day management practices and local negotiations 
(inter alia covering the recent economic crisis and periods of intensive restructuring). We 
conducted follow-up interviews in 2013. Fieldwork (extensive site visits and workplace 
observations) was supplemented by analysis of company documents, including collective 
agreements, corporate publications, press reports, and so forth. Interviews were conducted in the 
respondents’ native languages, translated, and appositively transcribed by professional translators. 
We used NVivo to facilitate data analyses, especially in terms of coding and structuring the data. 
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The codebook used for data analysis was initially built on theory (Table 3) but evolved over time. 
Hierarchical nodes were used to stress the interrelatedness of the data, which means that practices 
corresponding to various forms of flexibility and security were hierarchically linked. For example, 
the code “working-time” consisted of various practices, such as working-time accounts, overtime, 
or flexible shift systems. Specifically, the regular addition of newly gathered data to the previously 
coded interviews led to the development of new nodes and the adaption of existing nodes (e.g., 
merging nodes that seemed to overlap or dividing nodes that were too broad). Such adaptations 
were stimulated by continuous discussions among research team members, ensuring the 
integration of multiple perspectives when working with the data. Triangulation improved validity 
and provided a comprehensive representation of the local bargaining processes. In this respect, we 
argue that validity in this study pertains to the accounts or conclusions reached by using a 
qualitative multi-case study comparative method in a particular context for a particular purpose, 
as defined by Maxwell (2012) as a “realist” approach to validity. Furthermore, multiple observer 
involvement in conducting the interviews helped with consistency and internal data reliability. 
Flexicurity was operationalized by using the classification proposed by Wilthagen and Tros 
(2004), distinguishing different types of flexibility and security (Table 2). The practices in the right 
column belong to the flexibility and security dimensions. We examined these practices within 
subsidiary-level MNC contexts. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Findings   
Impact of Market Competition, Technology, and the Nature of the Product on 
Flexibility–Security Trade-Offs 
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Table 3 summarizes the flexicurity practices negotiated at subsidiary level, linking them to the 
corresponding dimensions listed in Table 2. Furthermore, it illustrates how a cluster of specific 
local practices leads to subsidiary-level outcomes (trade-offs), which are distinctive to each 
multinational. The table also highlights nuances between the practices negotiated in different 
subsidiaries of the same multinational. By drawing on the findings, it also shows that flexibility–
security outcomes are similar across subsidiaries within the same multinational. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Company1’s and Company2’s subsidiaries operated in highly competitive markets, characterized 
by low levels of technology used to manufacture standardized products. All subsidiaries were 
particularly exposed to competition from emerging economies due to low market entry barriers 
and the simplicity of production processes and products, encouraging imitation. The mostly low-
skilled production line workforces were predominantly engaged in repetitive tasks, which put them 
at risk of being replaced by workers on nonstandard contracts. This led to a constant threat of 
production relocation and to rapidly increasing flexibility and cost-competitiveness demands to 
safeguard each subsidiary’s market position. Contextual market and technology factors as well as 
the nature of the product influenced workers’ local bargaining power across subsidiaries, with 
workers being only minimally able to leverage power through unions. Although Company1’s 
brand name helped gain orders, according to local management the German subsidiary was close 
to bankruptcy in 2001 because of high production costs and low levels of flexibility. In negotiations 
on a restructuring plan, management threatened to close the plant, forcing the works council to 
agree to a 20% agency work quota and to implement cuts in non-statutory premiums such as shift 
premiums, reflecting wage flexibility. Working-time accounts and regularly changing working 
weeks of 28 to 42 hours depending on production volumes were implemented as forms of internal-
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numerical flexibility (Table 3). This reduced employee control over working time, with staff 
having to come in when there was work to do, or stay at home when the workload was low, both 
at short notice and with the threat of being easily substituted by less-expensive solutions. 
Many people worked the maximum 42h week, which is more than the industry 
average of 35h. We would hire people on temporary contracts; we would even 
pay overtime; we outsourced activities so it could work out. (Local HR manager, 
German subsidiary) 
When competitive pressure intensified for Company1’s Belgian subsidiary around 2005, 
management threatened to relocate production because of the high wages. 
A long time ago we used to be competitive at about 1$ an hour. Now we are the 
most expensive plant within Company1. This means that unions have to sacrifice 
something if they want to retain jobs in this country. (Local HR manager, Belgian 
subsidiary) 
The local unions had to agree to a 20% quota of fixed-term contracts as a source of external-
numerical flexibility to safeguard jobs. Moreover, they approved compensated working-time 
increases to be able to deal internally with workload fluctuations. In the British subsidiary, agency 
work (about 30% of the total workforce) was used primarily to deal with flexibility needs and cost 
pressure. Manual tasks in the plant could easily be transferred to agency workers, who were 
flexible, relatively inexpensive, and did not need much training. Furthermore, the night shift 
premium was cut (wage flexibility) and shift patterns were made flexible to reduce costly overtime 
during production peaks (see Table 3). Unions had to agree to cut overtime work and to increase 
external-numerical flexibility to guarantee the continuity of operations. 
The reliance on a few large-scale customers (40% of revenues came from three customers) and the 
high number of potential suppliers placed Company2’s subsidiaries in a weak market position. 
Furthermore, the simple technology used for manufacturing standardized products within each 
subsidiary created scope for benchmarking by management, leading to continuous threats of 
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production relocation. Additionally, all the subsidiaries produced just-in-time, meaning that the 
required flexibility often came without any security in return, with customer contracts dictating 
flexible production and order quantities. Local unions had to continuously nod through new 
concessions while simultaneously guaranteeing cost reductions and labor flexibility to satisfy 
customer needs. In all subsidiaries, internal-numerical flexibility was strengthened by 
implementing flexible shift systems, and in Britain, overtime was frequently used. Germany and 
Belgium also introduced 15% quotas on temporary (agency) work to save costs and to 
accommodate fluctuations through external-numerical flexibility. The German subsidiary 
implemented a hidden wage cut with an unpaid 2.5-hour working time increase per week without 
commensurate compensation. Saturday was treated as a normal working day without premiums 
being paid. In Britain the training budget was cut, while in Belgium functional flexibility became 
more pronounced, requiring workers to perform work at a minimum of three different workplaces 
to raise the plant’s adaptability in times of changing orders (see Table 3). 
In summary, competitive pressure within a context of low technology and standardized products 
dominated local negotiations within the Company1’s and Company2’s subsidiaries, with workers 
entrapped by market competition and unable to leverage power through the unions. At the same 
time, local management focused on increasing flexibility and cutting costs to safeguard the 
continuity of operations, as illustrated in Table 3. Although various practices were negotiated 
across subsidiaries, they all focused on augmenting flexibility, thereby reflecting the low level of 
workers’ structural power and leading to negative trade-offs across all subsidiaries. 
By contrast, workers enjoyed a high degree of structural power in Company3’s and Company4’s 
subsidiaries. This power stemmed from the use of complex technology to manufacture 
differentiated and mainly custom-built products. Competition was low, as was the cyclical 
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influence of employment insecurity. All subsidiaries focused on long-term (public) orders 
guaranteeing financial stability. This aspect in combination with the market, product, and 
technology conditions allowed local management to offer security, an important aspect for the 
workers, who were also more open-minded about accommodating management’s flexibility 
requests. These factors empowered local unions to put security on the bargaining agenda. 
Specifically, the German subsidiary’s works council in Company3 pushed for enhanced income 
security through a wage scheme upgrading the amounts set at sector level. Moreover, annual career 
development plans for all employees were negotiated to improve employability and to build up 
strong training- and career-related patterns. A greater focus was put on voluntary mobility for 
intercultural and vocational training purposes. Lifelong working-time accounts were implemented 
to accommodate possible workload peaks, as well as to give employees control over their working 
hours, with credited hours used for sabbaticals or early retirement, or to extend parental leave 
periods, for example. Likewise in Belgium, local unions and management agreed to allow long, 
compensated shifts at weekends to deal with peak workloads, but without forcing employees to 
work overtime. A voluntary inter-plant labor mobility system was introduced, helping to maintain 
job security. Management and unions consensually provided the necessary training and up-skilling 
that allowed rotations between different tasks, with the aim of retaining employees with specific 
technical skills. In Britain, complementary to group-wide training programs, unions locally 
negotiated further measures to ensure the workforce’s continuous training and development in 
response to the plant’s increased level of internal mobility. A detailed training plan for new hires 
was introduced. Use of external-numerical flexibility in Company3’s subsidiaries was overall 
generally low (see Table 3). Local unions expressed no need to negotiate temporary-work quotas 
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since local management stressed stability and skill retention independent of flexibility, a factor 
dictated by the scarcity of specific skills on the (local) labor market. 
If you don’t give staff a good contract, they’ll quickly find another job, meaning 
we lose them. (Local union representative, Belgian subsidiary) 
Similarly, Company4’s subsidiaries put an emphasis on training and development. For example, 
the German works council negotiated apprenticeships and advanced vocational training 
opportunities. Functional flexibility was strengthened by voluntary labor mobility and job rotation 
to simultaneously enhance internal-numerical flexibility and provide employment stability. 
Alongside labor mobility, the local Belgian unions pushed management to offer permanent 
contracts to newly recruited skilled workers, implying a high degree of job and income security 
right from the start. In Britain, management demands for internal-numerical flexibility and job 
mobility were met with extensive training, which enabled the workforce to cope with changing 
(skill) requirements. 
In summary, the low competitive pressure attributable to a limited number of competitors and 
strong market entry barriers, combined with the long-term character of orders and a predictable, 
technically complex business environment for the diversified products, were crucial factors giving 
workers a relatively high degree of control at Company3 and Company4. As illustrated in Table 3, 
this strengthened union capacity to bargain for workforce security through various practices in 
local negotiations, resulting in a positive trade-off across all subsidiaries. 
Variation within Positive and Negative Trade-Offs: Effect of Inter-Subsidiary 
Dependencies 
Variation within the positive and negative flexibility–security trade-offs is accounted for by the 
way subsidiary operations are integrated. Each subsidiary in Company1 performs a distinct part of 
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the production process in an integrated chain. The subsidiaries are responsible for ensuring a 
smooth flow of semi-finished products between the operating units in the global production 
network. The fact that Company1’s subsidiaries produce standardized products requiring simple 
technology enables management to benchmark between them, leading to cost and flexibility 
pressure. As shown earlier, although this undermines workers’ power, the dependencies between 
the subsidiaries within the vertically integrated chain offer labor some scope with which to tackle 
flexibility pressure by bargaining concessions with local management under the threat of strike 
action. This scenario has helped unions trade off increased flexibility for short-term job security. 
We agree to greater flexibility only under the condition that the employees will 
have greater security in return. If we give something to capital we want to have 
something back. Otherwise we go on strike. (European Works Council member, 
German subsidiary) 
In Germany, the works council traded acceptance of a 20% agency work quota for a short-term 
employment guarantee for the regular workforce. Furthermore, the regular workforce had to accept 
higher levels of working-time flexibility and lower pay premiums in exchange. In Belgium, unions 
negotiated a 20% quota of fixed-term work and overtime to cover production peaks internally to 
safeguard jobs. In Britain, the unions approved a 30% quota for agency workers in exchange for 
continuity of plant operations. In short, at each observed subsidiary in Company1, unions conceded 
different forms of flexibility (especially internal- and external-numerical) to gain security (see 
Table 3). The outcome is a “balanced” negative trade-off because of the concession dimension 
within a context of labor’s weak structural power. 
By contrast, the presence in different national markets of Company2’s subsidiaries performing 
similar operations resulted in strong flexibility pressure. Customers required their suppliers to 
deliver high-quality products flexibly, at low cost and just-in-time. Moreover, the fact that 
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Company2’s subsidiaries manufactured standardized products facilitated benchmarking, allowing 
managers to compare production costs and flexibility levels across subsidiaries, leading to 
enormous pressure for flexibility under the constant threat of production relocation. 
Pressure has increased over the last years. The customer wants to have a German 
product at Polish prices. The cost of a Polish engineer is only 1/3 that of a 
German engineer, meaning that you could have three Polish for one German 
engineer. (Local HR manager, German subsidiary) 
Local unions had to negotiate ways of improving the plant’s adaptability because of customer 
requests for price cuts. This trend led to the implementation of flexible shift systems linked to 
product demand in Germany, Belgium, and Britain, thereby reducing workforce control over 
working time and job content. Furthermore, the use of atypical work increased, especially in 
Belgium and Germany, to cut costs and to increase flexibility levels. Finally, enormous cost 
pressure led to wage cuts in Germany and Britain. Overall, under a production system 
characterized by subsidiaries with similar roles, and within workplaces with relatively weak 
workers’ structural power, the threat of production relocation pushed the local unions to accept 
high levels of flexibility without security in return (see Table 3), resulting in an unbalanced 
negative trade-off across subsidiaries. 
The distinction between balanced and unbalanced trade-offs could also be observed in 
Company3’s and Company4’s subsidiaries. These subsidiaries manufactured differentiated 
products using high levels of technology, facing only limited competition. This configuration 
reduced the extent to which management could threaten to relocate production, while putting 
workers in a relatively strong bargaining position. The differentiated and mostly custom-built 
nature of the product inhibited inter-subsidiary comparisons by management across the 
horizontally integrated subsidiaries in Company3 and enabled local negotiations on security 
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independent of flexibility. For example, in Germany, management agreed to financially support 
former apprentices going to university or technical college as a way of developing and retaining 
skilled workers. In Belgium, a wide-ranging training program was negotiated, and permanent 
employment was offered to skilled temporary workers after a short probationary period. In Britain, 
standardized internal promotion procedures were negotiated and formalized in a detailed 
assessment handbook covering competences and training. Moreover, the German works council 
rejected management’s request to pay surplus hours into the workforce’s working-time accounts, 
as this would have meant starting to work overtime again. The works council similarly opposed a 
higher quota of 40-hour employment contracts than allowed by the sector-level agreement to 
protect employees—especially those regularly working overtime—from long working hours. 
Although management in Belgium announced a 30% downsizing, the unions refused concessions 
on wages to avoid job losses, instead negotiating a working-time reduction and temporary 
unemployment to maintain workforce security. In Britain, the unions changed management’s 
perception of temporary agency workers as a cost-saving flexibility buffer by negotiating higher 
wages and a career progression scheme (permanent contract after six months) for skilled agency 
workers. Thus, security was negotiated independent of flexibility (see Table 3), leading to an 
unbalanced positive trade-off across all subsidiaries. 
By contrast, inter-subsidiary dependencies along the value chain in Company4 increased the 
company’s vulnerability to local bargaining pressure from workers and trade unions in a situation 
where management wanted to avoid production chain disruptions. Furthermore, workers’ local 
bargaining power benefited from the fact that products were differentiated, decreasing the scope 
for benchmarking across the different operations. 
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There might be a limited possibility for benchmarking, but so far management has 
not resorted to it. This is very important because it avoids pitting workers in 
different countries against each other. (European Works Councilor, German 
subsidiary) 
In sum, vertically integrated subsidiaries within a context of differentiated products, high 
technology, and high skill levels have enabled workers and unions to achieve favorable local 
solutions with management, consenting to enhanced flexibility and security simultaneously. 
Unions concluded local agreements on training and career development to increase employment 
security, compensating for the flexibility provided by the workforce This move led to a balanced 
positive trade-off achieved in a climate of consensus in which management and unions were 
interested in protecting skilled workers (see negotiated security practices illustrated in Table 3). 
Hence, under positive trade-offs, balanced outcomes were achieved when inter-subsidiary 
dependencies were created through vertical links, meaning that workers could leverage inter-plant 
dependencies as instances for structural power to gain security. In the case of horizontal inter-
subsidiary dependencies, security outweighed flexibility, leading to an unbalanced trade-off. 
Collective Bargaining and Flexibility–Security Trade-Offs 
Differences in national bargaining systems were reflected in locally negotiated flexibility and 
security practices, which created nuances regarding the subsidiaries’ flexibility–security outcomes 
across (and within) companies. 
The delegation characterizing Belgium’s multilevel bargaining system provided a set of rules that 
management and unions had to follow in local negotiations. The difficulty to derogate from sector-
level bargaining decreased management’s discretion, since agreements had to be negotiated within 
the existing sector-level framework. 
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Belgian trade unions prefer to have national or sector-level collective agreements 
instead of company-level agreements because they set a general framework valid 
for all workers, no matter whether they work for very small, small or large 
companies. (Trade union official, Belgium) 
The Belgian sector-level agreement foresaw various internal-numerical flexibility measures to 
cope with fluctuating workloads, and the subsidiaries used them in the form of highly flexible shift 
systems. Though they could have used external-numerical flexibility measures for this purpose as 
well, the possibility to negotiate temporary unemployment schemes reduced the incentive to use 
agency or fixed-term work in the first place. These schemes enable companies to temporarily 
suspend employment contracts during difficult periods and thus retain staff. Unions were also in 
favor of these schemes since they simultaneously guaranteed workers’ wages and secured their 
jobs. From an employer perspective, temporary unemployment is a flexible tool for coping with 
short-term economic difficulties that helps save costs and allows vocational training, pending 
economic recovery. Temporary unemployment helped unions bargain for security-enhancing 
measures for employees vis-à-vis managements’ request for increased flexibility. 
In Belgium, we have the advantage of job and income protection mechanisms that 
can be used at company level. We can put workers on temporary unemployment, 
and in such periods we can send people to training. This allows us to protect our 
workforce, but not every country does. (Trade union official, Belgian subsidiary - 
Company1) 
In Germany, internal-numerical flexibility measures related especially to working time. The 
respective opening clause in the sector-level agreement led to a variety of plant-level practices 
complementing and integrating the German state-provided security measures, for example, 
topping-up benefits for short-time working. In comparison to the temporary unemployment used 
in Belgium, short-time working in Germany operated alongside a variety of other locally 
negotiated flexibility practices, with the result that its overall security-enhancing effects were 
weaker. For instance, various forms of working-time accounts (with time horizons of six months, 
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two years, or lifelong), varying weekly working hours in line with orders, and flexible shift systems 
linked to production volumes were implemented in German subsidiaries. The resulting enhanced 
internal-numerical flexibility thus came in the shape of various working-time–related practices. 
Working-time flexibility was also pronounced in Britain. Within an institutional context where 
workers’ collective resources depend on local power imbalances, British management was able to 
implement flexible shift systems and high overtime, resulting in enhanced flexibility across 
subsidiaries. 
As illustrated in Table 3, in comparison with the MNCs’ Belgian subsidiaries, the German and the 
British ones made relatively high use of external-numerical flexibility in the form of agency and 
fixed-term contracts. As indicated above, the availability of temporary unemployment schemes in 
Belgium decreased the incentive to use external-flexibility practices. This was not the case in 
Germany as, despite a short-time working scheme guaranteeing security, wider scope for locally 
negotiating flexible-enhancing practices was created. It allowed lower-level agreements to 
derogate from the regulations set at higher levels. Moreover, the equality principle between regular 
and temporary workers, set at a national level by Belgian law, could not be circumvented, ruling 
out the possibility of using agency workers for cost reasons. This principle arguably helped Belgian 
works councils when negotiating plant-level agreements. The equality principle as well as the fact 
that agency workers were institutionally represented by the trade unions empowered local 
employee representatives to conclude relatively low agency work thresholds with management. 
The outcome was different in Germany and Britain, where agency work was considered a cheap 
and flexible source of labor supply. In Germany, agency and regular workers are covered by 
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different collective agreements.1 Compared to the metal sector agreement, the one for agency 
workers sets lower wages, pay premiums, and holiday and Christmas allowances, creating an 
incentive for management to use agency work, as illustrated by its high use across subsidiaries in 
Table 3. Works councils were hardly in a position to oppose this given their limited co-
determination rights on this matter. Within the weakly regulated British bargaining context, the 
use of agency workers was relatively high. Because of the absence of sector-level bargaining, local 
unions were entrapped in situations in which local power imbalances influenced plant-level 
negotiations on flexible practices. 
Although the law has recently changed in Britain, agency workers are still not on 
the same conditions as permanent ones. In practice, they are less likely to claim 
their rights because they’re afraid of losing their job. (European Works Council 
member, British subsidiary) 
Moreover, wage cuts were avoided in Belgium, since the sector-level agreement prohibited 
reducing wages through company-level negotiations even during crisis periods. With pay not an 
integral part of company-level packages addressing flexibility, union capacity to guarantee income 
security was increased. Conversely, management was able to impose wage cuts in German and 
British subsidiaries. In Germany, those cuts were achieved primarily through reducing the levels 
of certain pay premiums (e.g., shift premiums), but also by means of a non-compensated working-
time extension. Furthermore, an opening clause on wages enabling a shift from sector to local level 
was available, helping employers to push through flexibility-enhancing measures. 
IG Metall has always fought against opening clauses. We want companies to stick 
strictly to the labor agreement. A lot of works council members complain that they 
feel pressured by their managers during negotiations. They are sometimes fed up 
with negotiating and compromising and they prefer negotiations to take place at 
another level and not within their company. (IG Metall official) 
                                                 
1 In Germany, agency workers are covered by the agency work sector’s agreement. Since 2012 the metalworking 
sector agreement has encouraged works councils to locally negotiate agency work. 
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In Britain, wage cuts could be used since there was no sector-level agreement defining specific 
wage levels. Hence, cost pressure could result in pay cuts to guarantee the continuity of plant 
operations. In summary, the binding sector-level agreements in Belgium enabled local unions to 
negotiate security-enhancing practices across subsidiaries. Conversely, German works councils 
faced overall difficulties in negotiation, since the derogation capacity available through the 
bargaining system could be used discretionally by local management to push through flexibility-
enhancing measures. Reflecting the local power imbalances typical of a single-employer 
bargaining system, management within British subsidiaries adopted a variety of flexibility-
enhancing practices (see Table 3). 
 
Explaining the Trade-Offs: Macro–Micro-Level Interaction 
The case studies show various flexibility–security configurations, with different practices used in 
the national subsidiaries of the same MNC. Findings also illustrate that the diversity in collective 
bargaining arrangements within national institutional contexts can explain cross-national 
variations of bargaining content. In particular, differences in the bargaining structure (single- or 
multi-employer) and the form of opening mechanisms allowing decentralization to the company 
level (with or without derogation) together allowed higher or lower degrees of local discretion. 
This decentralization created nuanced differences in the locally negotiated flexibility and security 
measures, which were reflected in the negotiated outcomes or flexibility–security trade-offs. 
Security-enhancing (or flexibility-reducing) and security-reducing (or flexibility-enhancing) 
measures were identified across subsidiaries of the same multinational, depending on the extent to 
which the institutional context contributed to generating collective resources for workers. Sector 
agreements played a role in shaping subsidiary-level negotiations under multi-employer systems, 
28 
 
 
where linkage between sector and local levels was achieved through delegation (Belgium and 
Germany). Conversely, under single-employer bargaining (Britain), union positions were less 
secure due to the absence of protection provided by a sector agreement. This pattern is why, for 
example, British subsidiary-level agreements featured relatively more flexibility-enhancing 
measures through wage flexibility and the use of agency work, compared with Belgian agreements 
in which more security-enhancing measures were identified. Nevertheless, multi-employer 
systems allowing derogation from sector agreements as in Germany widened local players’ room 
for maneuver on security-reducing (flexibility-enhancing) measures, in contrast to Belgium, where 
subsidiary-level management and unions could only negotiate within a framework of sector-level 
agreements constraining the extent to which specific flexibility practices could be used. 
Moreover, we found that national regulation also influenced the extent to which bargaining content 
varied across the different bargaining systems, accentuating the abovementioned nuances between 
subsidiaries within the same MNC. This finding is exemplified by the availability of temporary 
unemployment schemes or the degree of regulation of external-flexibility (particularly temporary 
agency work). Unexpectedly, these aspects explain why local unions in Belgium negotiated 
working-time policies or temporary unemployment schemes to safeguard jobs instead of engaging 
in wage cuts, as in Germany and Britain. Additionally, the relatively high union and employer 
association density, which strengthens the relevance of sector-level agreements, and the union 
involvement in social security management, typical of the Ghent system reflecting union 
dominance in unemployment insurance, explains their sustained interest in negotiating temporary 
unemployment schemes in local-level negotiations. These features contribute to enlightening the 
distinctiveness of the bargaining content of local negotiations in each country. For example, 
subsidiary-level bargaining topics ranged from fixed-term contracts to agency work, from training 
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provisions and career development plans to temporary unemployment, from working-time 
schemes to job rotation, reflecting to a certain degree the specificity of national institutional 
contexts. We found no evidence of work–life balance (combination security) negotiations 
following this pattern across subsidiaries, which was unexpected to us. It may reflect that a one-
size-fits-all solution in this field is difficult to establish, as work–life balance measures may be 
individually negotiated between management and employees. 
The above-mentioned considerations imply that union negotiation capacity remains embedded in 
the respective national environments, and that the latter may contribute to shaping the dynamics 
and modalities through which specific bargaining outcomes are achieved. No causal relationship 
between national institutions and subsidiary-level flexicurity bargaining outcomes, however, was 
evident in the cases. This result shows that although flexibility–security practices differ in 
distinctive national settings, institutions—and in particular bargaining systems—are insufficient 
to explain the variety of flexibility–security trade-offs. These trade-offs are influenced by 
differences in workers’ structural power within MNC subsidiaries. The case studies illustrate 
strong intra-country variation regarding the different trade-offs across subsidiaries, reflecting the 
degree of workers’ structural power directly related to the subsidiaries’ markets, products, 
technological contexts, and inter-subsidiary dependencies shaping how the subsidiary is integrated 
into the multinational. Unions and management compromise on various issues at subsidiary level, 
with outcomes not only dependent on union capacities within their own distinctive institutional 
contexts but also on micro-level conditions as organizational features and local contexts shaping 
labor power. Such complexity suggests a dynamic view of institutions influencing power 
relationships within different MNC subsidiaries, and it means theoretically that the capacity 
institutions have to affect locally negotiated flexibility–security practices is not stable but evolves 
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in such a way that organizational, market, and technology conditions at the micro-level play an 
equally important role. 
We observe, for instance, that union capacity to influence negotiations is strongest in Company3’s 
and Company4’s subsidiaries (positive trade-offs). This circumstance is attributable to workers’ 
high structural power (Proposition 1), explained by low levels of competition, complex 
technology, and differentiated products. Conversely, workforce influence is weakest in 
Company1’s and Company2’s subsidiaries (negative trade-offs), which is the result of labor’s low 
structural power because of high competition, simple technology, and standardized products. 
However, we do also observe variation within the positive and negative trade-offs. Specifically, 
we identify unbalanced trade-offs in horizontally integrated subsidiaries. Likewise, balanced trade-
offs compensating flexibility and security occur under vertical integration. Hence, the form of 
inter-subsidiary dependencies in combination with local contextual factors shape the differences 
within positive and negative trade-offs (Proposition 2). Vertical interdependencies increase 
management’s vulnerability to local workers’ and union action. Other than expected, we found 
that inter-subsidiary dependencies and contextual factors do not act independently of each other. 
This finding is clearly illustrated in Company3’s subsidiaries, in which differentiated products 
increased workers’ local bargaining power by inhibiting inter-plant benchmarking threats by 
management. 
Overall, the case studies reveal that the main source of differences among subsidiaries is according 
to MNC organizational configuration and local contextual factors while the effects of collective 
bargaining institutions are more nuanced. Whereas a given union’s degree of influence in 
negotiations over flexibility and security is uneven across countries, findings illustrate that the 
capacity to oppose flexibility and to increase security differ with respect to company-level as well 
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as country-level institutional features. Both levels exercised influence, although the impact of 
bargaining institutions is lesser in degree than that according to company (MNC). Although this 
conclusion may sound empirically limitative—with research constrained to 12 subsidiaries within 
four MNCs—it is clear that using an interdependent framework linking national and local levels 
proved useful in characterizing this interaction as dynamic. 
 
Conclusion 
In this article we demonstrate the usefulness of researching the interaction between institutional 
arrangements, MNC subsidiary configurations, and market and technological contexts to examine 
subsidiary-level flexibility–security trade-offs. It underlines the importance of studying what 
happens below the level of national institutions, distinguishing between micro- and macro-level 
determinants of MNC subsidiaries’ flexibility–security trade-offs. This approach reveals that 
trade-offs are shaped by differences in workers’ structural power within the subsidiaries studied. 
Specifically, through their impact on local power, MNC subsidiary configurations and market and 
technological local contexts concur to explain the changing nature of flexibility–security trade-
offs across and within countries. At the same time, differences in national institutional settings 
influence the content of bargaining. Specifically, they provide labor with room to maneuver when 
bargaining locally with management on flexibility and security measures. This influence results in 
different degrees to which security (or flexibility) can be enhanced or reduced in local negotiation 
within the distinctive flexibility–security trade-off. It implies the use of different locally negotiated 
measures, reflecting nationally institutionalized flexibility and security practices. 
Cross-country differences lead us to assume that workers have better opportunities to resist 
flexibility and to enhance security in Belgium and Germany—more so in Belgium than in 
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Germany because of the less decentralized and more coordinated bargaining system and the 
stronger role of the unions—than in Britain. Most important, we found high within-country 
variation between subsidiaries that was consistent in its pattern across countries. Our first two 
propositions explain this result. We demonstrated that subsidiary-level contextual factors 
(competition, technology, nature of the product) affect workers’ structural power on flexibility–
security trade-offs (Proposition 1). We also showed that the form of inter-subsidiary dependencies 
or integration into the MNC influences whether labor is able to balance flexibility and security in 
local negotiations (Proposition 2). Given these differences, we demonstrated that diverse collective 
bargaining arrangements additionally affect the extent to which labor can choose specific security-
enhancing or flexibility-increasing measures within each distinctive trade-off (Proposition 3). 
Subsidiary configurations and market and technological contexts help to understand unions’ 
degrees of influence on flexibility–security trade-offs. This finding is relevant for the literature on 
flexicurity, as it shows that these configurations and local contexts, affecting negotiation processes 
and power relations, are as important as labor market regulatory settings for understanding 
flexibility–security outcomes. 
Two aspects in particular stress the study’s analytical and theoretical originality within the 
flexicurity debate. First, we address the importance of labor power shifts and dynamics within 
local settings in shaping flexibility–security outcomes. Second, we illustrate that bargaining 
arrangements affect the content but not the outcomes of local negotiations, mediating but not 
determining the power-related effects on flexicurity outcomes. This finding raises important 
analytical and theoretical implications for the literature on coalition building, union power, and 
resources (Doellgast 2008; Frege and Kelly 2013). Although theoretical questions on local power 
resources are beyond the scope of this article, the findings show that organizational configurations, 
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market, and technological contexts influence how unions are able to leverage collective resources 
to wield power in negotiating with management. 
This study does, however, have some limitations. First, the empirical research was developed at a 
time when the effects of the economic crisis were still felt. Although we coped with this potential 
bias by looking retrospectively at the past 10 years when collecting the empirical data, it is likely 
that the crisis influenced the findings. Second, the article focused on multinationals, meaning that 
we do not know whether the conclusions drawn are valid for other types of companies such as 
SMEs. Third, the empirical study was confined to multinationals in one sector and their 
subsidiaries in three countries. Nonetheless, it is clear that the interdependent framework adopted, 
linking national and local levels, uncovered the interactive dynamic between macro and micro 
influences. Future research should emphasize this macro–micro interaction when studying how 
institutions influence power relationships within different local settings. 
 
Appendix 
[[Table A.1 right here]] 
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Table 1. MNC Overview 
 Company1 Company2 Company3 Company4 
MNC features 
Origin USA USA France France 
Global 
workforce 
125,000 24,000 60,000 90,000 
Sites 
worldwide 
> 300 > 100 > 250 > 200 
Products Machines, 
automotive/shipb
uilding 
components 
Emission and ride 
control systems for 
automotive 
Defense, security, 
ground transport, 
space and aerospace 
Transport, power 
generation and 
transmission 
Workforce Mostly blue-
collar 
Mostly blue-collar Mainly engineers Mainly engineers 
Customers Private Private Mostly public Mostly public 
(Inter-)Subsidiary features 
International 
integration  
Vertical Horizontal Horizontal Vertical 
Technology 
 
Simple Simple Complex Complex 
Nature of the 
product 
Standardized Standardized Differentiated Differentiated 
Market 
competition 
High High Low Low 
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Table 2. Operationalization of Flexibility and Security 
“Flexicurity” 
dimensions 
Flexibility and security practices 
External-numerical 
flexibility 
Atypical work (temporary agency work; fixed-term work; external contractors) 
(Keller and Seifert 2004) 
Internal-numerical 
flexibility 
Working-time flexibility (shift system, working-time accounts, overtime, flexible 
working week) 
(Wilthagen, Muffels, and Chung 2013) 
Functional flexibility Job rotation, internal mobility 
(Forrier and Sels 2003)  
Wage flexibility Wage reductions, variable payments systems 
(Glassner, Keune, and Marginson 2011)  
Job security Type of employment contract 
(Rydell and Wigblad 2011) 
Employment security Training, career progression, and outplacement schemes 
(Forrier and Sels 2003) 
Income security Wage-guarantee schemes, voluntary benefits 
(Bredgaard and Tros 2007) 
Combination security Work–life balance policies 
(Kossek and Lambert 2005) 
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Table 3. Summary of Local Flexibility–Security Bargained Measures 
MNC Company1 subsidiaries Company2 subsidiaries Company3 subsidiaries Company4 subsidiaries 
Location BRITAIN BEL GER BRITAIN BEL GER BRITAIN BEL GER BRITAIN BEL GER 
Employees 1,550 2,500 1,700 200 1,600 1,500 8,000 600 4,300 4,000 1,000 2,800 
Union density 
(%) 
70 95 80 79 95 75 30 85 25 50 95 75 
External-
numerical 
flexibility (%) 
(agency [AC], 
fixed-term 
contracts [FT]) 
 
30 AC 
 
None AC; 
20 FT 
 
20 AC 
 
7 AC 
 
5 AC ; 
10 FT 
 
15 AC 
 
8 AC 
 
8 AC 
 
3.5 AC 
 
35–40 AC 
 
20 AC 
 
10 AC ; 
10 FT 
Internal-
numerical 
flexibility (W-
T: working-
time) 
Flexible 
shifts 
Flexible 
shifts, W-T 
increase 
W-T 
accounts, 
flexible 
working 
week  
Flexible 
shifts, 
overtime 
Flexible 
shifts 
Flexible 
shifts 
— W-T 
reduction 
W-T 
accounts 
(also 
lifelong) 
— — W-T 
accounts, 
flexible 
shifts 
Functional 
flexibility 
— — — — Job 
rotation 
— Voluntary 
labor 
mobility 
Voluntary 
labor 
mobility 
Voluntary 
labor 
mobility 
— Job 
rotation, 
voluntary 
labor 
mobility 
Job 
rotation, 
voluntary 
labor 
mobility 
Wage flexibility Cuts in 
pay 
premiums 
— Cuts in 
pay 
premiums 
Wage & 
training 
budget cuts 
- Wage cuts - - - — — — 
Job security (% 
of permanent 
contracts)  
70 80 80 93 85 85 92 92 96.5 60-65 80 80 
Employment 
security 
— Training 
provision 
— — Training 
provision 
— Training, 
career 
planning, 
“graduate 
scheme” 
Training, 
career 
planning 
Training, 
annual 
developm
ent plans 
Training 
provision 
Training 
provision 
Training, 
“study 
grant” for 
former 
apprentices 
Income security — Temporary 
unemploym
ent 
Employm
ent 
guarantee, 
short-time 
work 
— Temporar
y 
unemploy
ment 
Short-time 
work 
— Temporar
y 
unemploy
ment 
Above-
tariff 
payment 
— — Financial 
support to 
apprentices, 
short-time 
work 
Combination 
security 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
Subsidiary-level 
outcome 
Balanced negative trade-off 
(Emphasis on flexibility in exchange 
for short-term job security) 
Unbalanced negative trade-off 
(Emphasis on flexibility without 
security in exchange) 
Unbalanced positive trade-off 
(Emphasis on security without 
flexibility in exchange) 
Balanced positive trade-off 
(Emphasis on security in exchange for 
the flexibility of the workforce) 
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[[Appendix Table]] 
 
Table A.1. Overview of Interviews 
 Company1(US
) 
Company2(US
) 
Company3(French
) 
Company4(French
) 
Tota
l 
European 
headquarters 
1 1 1 1 4 
Plant-level (HR 
managers) 
6 6 5 6 23 
Plant-level 
(employee 
representatives
) 
10 11 9 9 39 
Total per 
company 
17 18 15 16 66 
Sector-level 4 70 
 
